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In 1985 Montana modified its water policy
to respond to interjurisdictional marketing
challenges and opportunities. Four years later, this
effort to integrate public interest and market
approaches awaits stronger economic demand for
implementation of these innovations.
Meanwhile, several parallel developments
involving cross-jurisdictional water transfers and
related water management issues have arisen to
provide new challenges to policy makers. These
include tribal marketing agreements and negotiations,
management of shortages caused by severe drought,
public trust considerations of supplies adequate to
maintain fish, wildlife, and recreational values, and
legislative response to market demands for preserving
instream beneficial uses.
In 1989, the legislature responded more
cautiously to intrajurisdictional transfer
opportunities than it did to external threats and
opportunities in 1985. While economic demand for
these intrajurisdictional transfers is relatively
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strong, almost no demand currently exists for
interjurisdictional marketing.
Policymakers may now be better advised to
adopt the approaches employed in 1985 that allowed
state participation in interjurisdictional water
transfer opportunities while strongly safeguarding
in-state beneficial uses. Instead they have resisted
efforts to apply those same principles to internal
transfer opportunities.
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II. Montana's Response to Post-Sporhase 
Opportunities and Constraints 
A. As the state at the headwaters of two major
river systems, the Missouri and the Columbia, Montana
faces both opportunities and the need for considered
restraint in the management of those waters.
Montana's modern water policy, highlighted by its
legislation relative to interjurisdictional
transfers, thus developed against the backdrop of
several converging events and trends:
1.	 Predictions of rapid and full-scale
development of Montana's vast coal reserves that
would require huge amounts of water from the
Yellowstone River, one of the last free-flowing major
western rivers.
2. Perceptions of increased demand from
downstream states, some involving interstate
transfers, that transformed earlier complacency based
on abundance.
3. Strong initiatives to assert federal
and Indian water claims reserved in a state with
major proportions of tribal and public lands.
4. The 1982 U.S. Supreme Court decision
in Sporhase v. Nebraska 458 U. S. 953 (1982)
indicating, along with other important elements, that
water is a commodity not unlike other commercial
goods that move relatively unimpeded.
5. The 1982 announcement by South Dakota
that it had sold 50,000 acre-feet of water per year
to the ETSI coal slurry pipeline consortium for a
prospective $1.4 billion.
6. Efforts within Montana to remove
statutory restraints on the exportation of water so
that Montana could also profit from ETSI-type deals.
7. Increasing conflict among the states
in the Missouri River Basin that fueled both a "race
to the waters" and instability in management.
B.	 The years just preceding the issuance of
the Sporhase decision had brought fear to Montana
legislators of massive energy development and
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conversion of agricultural water use to industrial
consumptive uses both within and outside Montana's
borders. They responded in 1979 with enactment of a
ban on the exportation of water and a provision
specifically determining that use of water for coal
slurry was not a beneficial use under Montana's water
law.
But by the commencement of the 1983 legislature,
post-Sporhase events coincided to produce mounting
urgency on the part of many policymakers, including
then Governor Ted Schwinden, to sell water to produce
revenues to fund the water development projects
necessary to save Montana's water. Widely cited as
justification for this paradoxical approach was a
study done by Frank Trelease and Wright Water
Engineers for the Montana Department of Natural
Resources and Conservation entitled "A Water
Protection Strategy for Montana" setting forth a
strategy to protect Montana's options for future
instate development of Missouri River waters in the
face of expanding use by downstream states.
During the 1983 legislative session, three bills
were introduced concerning water marketing. Only one
of them passed: HB 908, which temporarily patched up
Montana's clearly unconstitutional anti-export ban
and created a Select Committee on Water Marketing.
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The Select Committee was directed by HB 908 to
undertake a comprehensive study of economic, tax,
administrative, legal, social, and environmental
advantages and disadvantages of water marketing. But
the Select Committee soon saw the need to broaden its
scope of study to incorporate many more features of a
water policy that could withstand and accommodate
competing interests. In its final report, the Select
Committee emphasized the importance of a
comprehensive state water policy to maximize and
reserve for the present and future use of its
citizens Montana's fair share of the water in
interstate rivers and streams--particularly those of
the Missouri. To give authority to this policy, the
Select Committee introduced BB 680, which was enacted
on April 19, 1985. (Ch. 573, Mont. Laws 1985)
C.	 HR 680 made significant changes in several
areas of Montana water policy and attempted to assert
the maximum constitutional authority of the state
over the intra- and interstate movement of water.
1.	 The legislature applied increasingly
stringent public interest criteria to applications
for new water permits. Because drafters of the
legislation feared that these permit criteria would
encourage potential appropriators to purchase
existing rights and change the type or location of
use or to secure water under the state's water
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reservation system, these public interest criteria
were added to those methods of obtaining water as
well.
Three levels of review are applied to
increasingly larger and more consumptive amounts of
water to be appropriated. The first level requires
only the traditional examination of the potential
effect of a new water use on other appropriators in a
basin. This level applies to all appropriations,
small and large, in-state and out-of-state. The
second level, which is the first set of public
interest criteria, applies to diversions in excess of
4000 ac-ft/yr and 5.5 cfs and dictates a more
thorough evaluation for the broader statewide public
interest as well as a higher burden of proof. The
third level mandates an especially careful public
welfare review of applications to appropriate water
out-of-state use.
These special public interest, or
conservation, criteria were designed to conform to
the "window" left open in Sporhase for states to
prefer their own citizens for water if necessary for
"health and safety" purposes. The language of the
criteria is based on a New Mexico statute adopted to
respond to El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379
(D.N.M. 1983) and 597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984).
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Varying treatment was given to permits
and changes when a larger amount of water would be
consumed. Change applications that would result in
consumption of water in excess of 4000 ac-ft/yr and
5.5 cfs are allowed, but must be approved by the
legislature. On the other hand, permits for an
amount exceeding this threshold are disallowed,
except if the Department of Natural Resources and
Conservation is the appropriator.
2.	 The second major feature of the 1985
water policy legislation is an innovative limitation
on the private ability to appropriate water.
Applicants must now lease water from the state
Department of Natural Resources and Conservation when
they seek to consume unappropriated water in excess
of 4000 ac-ft/yr and 5.5 cfs or to move water in any
amount out of six specified water basins located
wholly or partly within the state. Applicants must
also satisfy the relevant public interest criteria
and the requirements of the state Environmental
Policy Act (75-1-101 et seq., Mont. Code Ann.) As
noted earlier, only the Department of Natural
Resources and Conservation may appropriate water in
these large consumptive amounts.
The department administers the program
and determines the price and other terms and
conditions of the lease. The legislation authorizes
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differential pricing. Water is to be leased from
federal reservoirs or from reservoirs in adjudicated
basins. The program limits leasing to no more than
50,000 ac-ft in total at the present time.
As the proprietor of the leased water,
the state may be able to regulate the interstate
movement of water in a manner that would be otherwise
impermissible under the dormant Commerce Clause of
the U.S. Constitution. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
3. Other elements of the comprehensive
water policy revisions enacted in 1985 include an
accelerated water reservation program, increased
efforts toward negotiation among Missouri River Basin
states and tribes, and the placing of large pipelines
under the Montana Major Facility Siting Act
(75-20-101 et seq., Mont. Code Ann.).
D.	 In an important side issue, Sporhase 
principles were also further developed in Intake 
Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Commissioners,
769 F. 2d 568 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1163 (1983). This case tested the restraints on the
interstate movement of water contained in the
Yellowstone River Compact. Intake Water Company
appropriated 80,000 ac-ft/yr of water from the
Yellowstone for export out-of-state and out-of-basin.
Intake challenged the unanimous consent provision of
the compact, saying it violated the commerce clause
and equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution.
The courts held that the compact is immune from
commerce clause scrutiny because it was approved by
Congress and was therefore federal law. The equal
protection argument was dismissed on the grounds that
the clause protects people and corporations--not
geographic areas.
III. State-Tribal Marketing Opportunities 
A. With the passage of the water
marketing legislation in 1985, Montana also entered
an historic agreement for joint state-tribal water
marketing with the Fort Peck Indian tribe. This
agreement resulted from Montana's commitment to
negotiate settlements of water controversies - not
just with other states in the Missouri River Basin,
but with tribal governments within its borders.
Tribal commitment to the negotiation process
contributed equally to its success.
The joint marketing agreement of the
Fort Peck Compact, along with the implicit promise of
future marketing agreements with the
Sioux-Assiniboine and other tribal governments is set
against the backdrop of two important factors:
1. The 1979 legislature adopted, and
each subsequent legislature has affirmed, a policy of
negotiating with the tribes and the federal
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government for the quantification of those entities'
reserved water rights within Montana. Occurring at
the same time that state water rights are undergoing
adjudication under a statewide program, these tribal
and federal rights are the subject of negotiation by
the Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission.
While the Montana Supreme Court
held in State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish
and Kootenai Tribes 712 P. 2d 754 (Mont. 1985) that
the state's adjudication program has been found
adequate on its face for adjudicating both federal
and Indian reserved water rights, Montana has chosen
to attempt to first negotiate the settlement of those
rights rather than face costly litigation. To date
only one compact (the Fort Peck Compact) has been
entered, although negotiations with several other
tribes and federal agencies are underway.
2.	 The major source of water
development in Montana derives from the Pick-Sloan
Program embodied in the Flood Control Act of 1944 for
the Missouri River Basin. However, states in the
Upper Basin generally contend that they have received
fewer benefits than downstream states, which have
received considerable economic gain from navigation
and flood control while the upstream states have
reaped only small increases in irrigation. Tribes in
the Upper Basin have received even fewer benefits.
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Indeed, their economic and cultural losses from the
Pick-Sloan Program have been severe throughout the
basin. only with the application of the Winters
doctrine and its interpretation in the courts have
tribes in Montana and the rest of the basin begun to
recoup some of those losses.
The few (but massive) federal
impoundments on the Missouri and its tributaries in
Montana are the likely sources of any future
interjurisdictional water marketing that might occur
if economic conditions improve. Significantly, most
of these reservoirs (e.g., Yellowtail, Fort Peck, and
Tiber) are the subject of substantial tribal claims.
The resolution of those claims is likely to involve
agreements for joint state-tribal marketing similar
to that entered in the Fort Peck Compact.
Negotiations for joint marketing in each of these
situations have commenced.
B.	 Ratified by the Fort Peck Tribes and
adopted by the legislature in 1985, the Fort Peck
Compact contains an allocation of 1,050,542 acre-feet
or a consumptive use of 523,236 acre-feet, whichever
is less, for the tribes from the Missouri River, its
tributaries, and underlying groundwater. The Compact
authorizes the tribes to market water off the
reservation and to market jointly with the state.
The tribes must give the state an opportunity to
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participate in any marketing but may proceed on its
own if the state declines.
As long as the state markets jointly
with the tribes, any proposed marketing opportunity
must meet the provisions of Montana law in effect at
the time of the proposed transfer. Transfer of water
outside the reservation is limited to 50,000
acre-teet and is tied to the statutory limit in the
state water leasing program described above. As the
state's leasing limit increases, however, so does
that apply to the tribes. If the state does not have
a marketing program, the tribes are subject either to
limitations established in federal law or to
limitations in state law that would apply to any
appropriative right.
Opinions as to the relative advantages
and disadvantages to both the state and the tribes
conferred by the Compact differ. Some tribal
advocates assert that the Compact limits the ability
of the tribes to market water independent of state
interference. Other critics contend that the state
shortchanged itself and abrogated too much authority.
None of these contentions has been vindicated,
however, as the marketing provisions of the Compact
have yet to be tested. But negotiations with other
tribes are proceeding under the assumption that
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similar provisions regarding joint marketing will be
written.
IV. Post-1985 Developments 
A.	 Montana's water leasing program, the
Fort Peck Compact, and other elements of the state's
water policy associated with the passage of HB 680
arose from a set of assumptions about the economic
demand for those waters. But many of those
assumptions have proved too optimistic (or
pessimistic, depending on one's point of view). Full
implementation of several of these policy initiatives
stalled because of the reality of ensuing events and
conditions.
Montana's economy, along with other
states in the northern tier and Rocky Mountain
regions, boomed in the seventies and early eighties.
But the dream (or nightmare) of massive
industrialization and growth through energy
development never reached fruition. Declines in all
of Montana's basic industries (mining, agriculture,
forestry, oil and gas) except tourism have meant
shrinking state revenues. The national demand for
Montana's water simply hasn't materialized.
These economic realities have slowed
implementation of nearly all of the water policy
innovations adopted in 1985, yet the state's
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commitment to them remains strong. These realities,
along with recent climatalogical events, have
refocused the attention of policy-makers and water
managers to internal pressures to institute transfer
mechanisms to respond to intrajurisdictional needs.
B.	 The decline of Montana's extractive
industries has renewed interest in promoting
Montana's high-quality environment for tourism and
relocation of service-based businesses. An important
component of that quality environment is the
pristine, free-flowing river system that provides
fish, wildlife, and recreational values for residents
and tourists.
At the same time that these instream
values have gained importance to Montana's economy,
severe drought has weakened the state's agricultural
base and placed increasing pressure on scarce water
supplies. Montana's reliance on the prior
appropriation doctrine dictates that agricultural
beneficial uses, which generally hold senior rights,
take priority in the allocation of these dramatically
reduced streamf lows.
This agricultural predominance is
tempered by articulation of the public trust doctrine
in three cases decided by the Montana Supreme Court
since 1984. The three cases - Montana Coalition for
Stream Access v. Curran 682 P. 2d 163 (1984), Montana 
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Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth 682 P. 2d
1088 (1984), and Galt v. State 731 P. 2d 912 (1987) -
did not directly address the conflict between the
public interest in using water recreationally and the
prior appropriation doctrine. But such a direct
conflict is likely to occur unless water users,
administrators, and public policymakers work to
develop consensus on reasonable and equitable sharing
of the water resource during shortages.
This past summer saw many of Montana's
high quality fishing streams dewatered while
surrounding irrigation ditches drew any available
water. On river systems where storage capacity
existed, some irrigators negotiated with the
Department of Natural Resources and Conservation and
the Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks for the
purchase of water for instream use downstream. But
on many blue-ribbon streams where no storage existed,
significant dewatering occurred, and valuable
fisheries were lost.
Most legal experts believe that
Montana water law does not allow the change and
transfer of water rights to a use that does not
involve a diversion. Thus, changes of irrigation
rights to instream beneficial uses for the protection
of water quality, fisheries, and recreation have not
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occurred except in one instance where a small dam (a
diversion structure) was involved.
The controversy that surrounds the
issue of transfers for instream purposes within
Montana is at least as strong as the water marketing
frenzy that led to the enactment of Montana's
interjurisdictional water leasing program in 1985.
During the recent legislative session, angry ranchers
filled the halls of the Capitol, fearful that
lawmakers would steal the right to irrigate
established by their grandfathers and held dear for
generations. Equally vociferous were conservationists
who threatened lawsuits based on the public trust
doctrine, constitutional initiatives, and other legal
attacks should the legislature fail to facilitate
transfers for instream purposes.
C.	 The 1989 legislature responded even
more cautiously to intrajurisdictional transfer
opportunities than it did to external threats and
opportunities in 1985. After several near-deaths,
the bill that received eventual approval in the
legislature calls for a limited pilot program of
instream water leasing for a trial period that ends
on July 1, 1993.
These pilot, voluntary, leases may be
entered into only by the Department of Fish,
Wildlife, and Parks on no more than five stream
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reaches designated by the Board of Natural Resources
and Conservation. The bill provides that a lease
authorization must be obtained from the Department of
Natural Resources and Conservation through a process
similar to that provided for changes in appropriation
rights. Other restrictions include approval by the
citizen Fish and Game Commission before the
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks proceeds to
lease water rights. The legislation limits transfers
for instream purposes to temporary leases and to a
single public agency, the Department of Fish,
Wildlife and Parks. In summary, this legislation is
very tightly drawn, to the extent that whether it is
workable may be questioned.
V.	 Future Prospects 
A. Paradoxically, the only demand that
currently exists for water transfers in Montana -
instream flows - relates to that for which no
institutional mechanism is in place.
B. Legislators, water managers, and water
users must consider applying the same approaches that
led to the adoption of Montana's innovative water
marketing program in 1985 to the currently strong
demand for intrajurisdictional transfers for instream
uses. The model should balance public interest and
market approaches for the enhancement of Montana's
current economic realities.
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